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THE PUBLIC PORE SPACE: ENABLING





The growing threat of global climate change1 presents perhaps the
soundest contemporary case for comprehensive national action to miti-
gate future inter-jurisdictional environmental effects. A coherent national
legislative response to environmental change is often seen as necessary
to effectively respond to the widespread nature of climate change’s effects
and sources.2 In this way, climate change, and the concurrent concern
over increasing carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions,3 presents a striking
opportunity for government action on behalf of the public good. Indeed,
the threat of climate change represents perhaps the perfect example of
the “tragedy of the commons.”4 As Garrett Hardin explained, “we are locked
into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we behave only as
independent, rational, free enterprisers.”5 To prevent the harmful effects
of continued rational, independent action, some move towards collective,
public action is required to prevent unprecedented environmental harm
across jurisdictions.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, William & Mary School of Law; B.A. 2007, University of Montana.
The author would like to thank his family and fiancée for their constant support through-
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1 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger, eds., 2007) (stating that “warming of
the climate system is unequivocal” and that anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions are the
“most important” cause) [hereinafter IPCC].
2 Cf. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 110TH CONG., CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION
DESIGN WHITE PAPER: APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 1–2
(Comm. Print 2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/southeast/climate/policy/Climate
%20Dingell%20Third%20Paper%20Govt%20Roles%20022508.pdf (noting that a compre-
hensive national strategy would prevent the creation of an ad hoc state-based system that
may discourage private investment and fail to address trans-border concerns).
3 See IPCC, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that annual CO2 emissions grew by seventy percent
between 1970 and 2004).
4 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
5 Id. at 1245.
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In light of this, carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) has been in-
creasingly proffered as a potential temporary solution to the climate change
riddle—continued individual demand for CO2 emitting energy sources
coupled with collective anxiety over that demand—as it allows “the con-
tinued use of inexpensive fossil fuels while dramatically reducing accom-
panying greenhouse gas emissions.”6 To do this CCS, in its most popular
form, would inject the offending anthropogenic CO2 (in liquid “supercritical”
form) into underground storage spaces (“pore spaces”), which are most com-
monly found in old natural gas and oil reservoirs, unmineable coal beds,
and deep saline aquifers.7 Doing so would effectively remove vast amounts
of man-made CO2 (the primary greenhouse gas (“GHG”) culprit) from the
atmosphere, forestalling climate change while providing breathing room
for the development of alternative energy sources.8 CCS is not a permanent
solution, as both carbon reserves9 and potential storage spaces are limited,10
but the temporary benefits would be vast, as the United States generates
roughly fifty percent of its energy from coal, producing 1.5 billion tons of
CO2 annually.11 Widespread CCS may be the only “currently available
technology that allows very deep cuts to be made—at the scale needed—in
6 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration:
Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L. J. 103,
107 (2008).
7 Thomas R. Decesar, Comment, An Evaluation of Eminent Domain and a National Carbon
Capture and Geologic Sequestration Program: Redefining the Space Below, 45 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 261, 263 (2010).
8 Will Reisinger et al., Reconciling King Coal and Climate Change: A Regulatory Framework
for Carbon Capture and Storage, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2–3 (2009) (noting that as a “bridge
technology” to cleaner alternative sources, CCS could remove as much as ninety percent of
coal-fired plant CO2 emissions).
9 See generally WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, 2010 SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCES (A.W.
Clarke & J.A. Trinnaman, eds., 2010) (noting world energy reserves are finite, and listing
current estimates).
10 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND
STORAGE 221 (Bert Metz, et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports
/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf [hereinafter IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE]. Estimates of CCS
storage capacity are imprecise and vary by the type of formation and methodology used. The
IPCC estimates that at the low end, 1690 gigatons of CO2 (“GtCO2”) may be sequestered,
with a possible upper limit of 101,100 GtCO2 of storage. This broad range of storage esti-
mates is largely due to uncertainty surrounding the potential capacity of deep saline
formations, which can fluctuate by an order of magnitude. Id. at tbl.5.2. The IPCC con-
cludes that as “potential storage sites are likely to be broadly distributed,” underground
CCS storage is “likely to be adequate to store a significant proportion of [CO2] emissions
well into the future.” Id. at 197.
11 THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON CONSTRAINED WORLD ix (James R. Katzer
et al., eds., Mass. Inst. of Tech. 2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of
_Coal.pdf [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF COAL].
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atmospheric emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels,” and should be intensely,
and widely, pursued to forestall climate change.12
Ahead of an anticipated boom in CCS investment13 states have
begun to prepare the necessary legal groundwork to facilitate private
development, and have established rules relating to property interests
in the “pore space” and the resulting liability for the stored CO2. Three
states, Wyoming,14 Montana,15 and North Dakota,16 have statutorily de-
fined the property interest in the pore space estate and have granted it
to the surface estate owner. Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas have
addressed ownership of the sequestered CO2, but have not dealt with the
pore space.17 By placing the pore space estate with the owners of the sur-
face estate, Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming are setting up future
CCS as a largely private venture,18 a potentially incongruous, atomistic
response to a fundamentally collective, public threat. This legislative grant
of CCS control to individual land owners threatens to Balkanize what
should be a nationally coherent policy for carbon sequestration.19 The
potential creation of fifty separate pore space property regimes, which
would effectively require the cooperation of adjacent pore space owners
and jurisdictions, would have deleterious effects upon the implemen-
tation of a coherent national CCS plan. Further, as some state laws (such
as Montana’s and North Dakota’s) allow pore space owners to transfer
ownership and liability to the state after a set period of years,20 outright
12 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 5.
13 States are anticipating a share of the roughly $8 billion in federal money that has
been allocated for CCS projects, including $3.4 billion in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. Flurry of U.S. State, Federal Policies Advance CCS, CARBON CAPTURE
J., Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.carboncapturejournal.com/displaynews.php
?NewsID=344&PHPSESSID=1043389bcbaec9b35c510344a0524b43&PHPSESSID
=1043389bcbaec9b35c510344a0524b43.
14 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152 (2009).
15 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-11-180, 82-11-182 (2009).
16 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-31-02, 47-31-03, 47-31-04, 47-31-05 (West 2009).
17 See State CCS Policy—Sequestration, CCS REG., http://www.ccsreg.org/billtable.php
?component=Sequestration (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The majority have granted ownership
of the sequestered CO2 to the storage site operator. Id.
18 JERRY R. FISH & ERIC L. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA CARBON CAPTURE STORAGE REVIEW PANEL,
TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT: APPROACHES TO PORE SPACE RIGHTS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/carbon_capture_review_panel/meetings/2010
-08-18/white_papers/Pore_Space_Rights.pdf.
19 COL. CCS TASK FORCE, BRIEFING PAPER FOR DISCUSSION: OWNERSHIP OF PORE SPACE
1 (2010) available at http://dnr.state.co.us/SiteCollectionDocuments/CCS%20DOCS/Pore
SpaceOwnership-041610.pdf.
20 MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-183 (2009) (allowing transfer of title and liability to the state
after fifteen years if certain conditions are met); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-22-17 (2009) (allowing
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and infinite21 public ownership of vast underground carbon pools may
become a reality despite the public having little say on the front end.
Recognizing the complications inherent to private control over an
essentially public action, this Note aims to demonstrate that pore space
ownership should be vested in the public. As climate change and the result-
ing attempts at mitigation through CCS are public dilemmas of a national
scope, the deep pore space rightly belongs to the public trust. Granting
public ownership will simplify issues of regulation, liability, and permitting
across jurisdictions, while lessening issues related to the exercise of emi-
nent domain and storage basin unitization. Public ownership of the pore
space will legally clear the road for national implementation of a CCS
regime to address increasing carbon emissions. Indeed, as CCS moves from
the relatively sparsely populated West to the more densely populated East,
the establishment of public pore space ownership would proactively remove
significant private property hurdles to effective collective action.22 The ad
hoc, state-by-state implementation of distinct pore space property regimes
will only slow the maturation of a national CCS plan. CCS is unlike tra-
ditional subsurface extractive pursuits in that ownership largely involves
maintenance and liability long after the initial injection,23 removing any
profit incentives related to continued private ownership. The impoundment
of a harmful substance for the public good should be the province of the
public trust.
ROADMAP
Part I of this Note will cover the present state of CCS, detailing how
it may be applied to mitigate climate change and carbon emissions. Part II
transfer of title and liability to the state ten years after injection ceases if certain conditions
are met).
21 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 25 (“To be effective as a climate mitigation strategy, CO2
storage must be near infinite, and thus contract, tort, and statutory liability will extend long
after the injection ends.”).
22 The reservoirs that are amenable to carbon sequestration underlie vast areas of land,
commonly crossing not only private boundaries, but state lines as well. The surface estates
that lay above these formations include private, state, federal, and tribal lands. See NAT’L
ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2010 CARBON SEQUESTRATION ATLAS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 23–33 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CARBON SEQUESTRATION
ATLAS]. The Department of Energy has identified over 22,564 billion tons of storage potential
and more than forty years of storage spread across twenty-nine states and four provinces.
Id. at 27–29.
23 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 25.
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will examine how the legal treatment of the airspace may be applied to pore
spaces and CCS, how potential takings claims may be addressed, and how
the pore space is currently treated at common law. Part III will examine
how the pore space has been treated by the three states (Montana, North
Dakota, and Wyoming) that have passed statutes concerning pore space
ownership.24 Part III will also examine the inadequacies and potential pit-
falls related to these statutory definitions. Lastly, this Note will conclude
by summarizing the public policy rationales and normative recommen-
dations for public pore space ownership.
I. CARBON SEQUESTRATION, GREENHOUSE GASES, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Global Warming
Carbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) is largely advanced as
a method of permanently locking away anthropogenic carbon dioxide gas
(“CO2”) to reduce or eliminate the effects associated with increased emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (“GHG”).25 GHGs such as CO2 negatively affect
the global climate system by altering the natural energy flow, affecting the
“absorption, scattering and emission of radiation within the atmosphere
and at the Earth’s surface,” ultimately leading to a global “warming.”26 This
energy imbalance (“positive radiative forcing” in the literature) can lead to
higher average global temperatures, higher sea levels, reduced snow and
ice coverage, an increased frequency of extreme weather, and changes
in precipitation patterns.27 Scientists have linked the post–Industrial
Revolution increase in anthropogenic GHG emissions to these negative cli-
mate effects and label CO2 as the “most important anthropogenic GHG.”28
24 The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (“IOGCC”) has developed a model act
that largely mirrors these three states. INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, STORAGE
OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURE: A LEGAL AND REGULATORY GUIDE FOR
STATES AND PROVINCES (2007), available at http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/co2
/IOGCC%20Master%20CO2%20Regulatory%20Document%209-2007.pdf [hereafter IOGCC].
25 See IPCC, supra note 1, at 60 tbl.4.2. Admittedly, CCS is not the only mitigation strategy
that should be pursued. Alternative forms of energy, energy conservation, and even new
methods of land use planning and building design should all be utilized to reduce the
effects of climate change. Id.
26 IPCC, supra note 1, at 37; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, 2–9 (Susan Solomon, et al., eds., 2007) available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report
_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm [hereinafter IPCC Physical Science].
27 IPCC, supra note 1, at 26–33.
28 Id. at 36.
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Reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions is thus central to mitigating the
ill effects of climate change.29
Of the man-made GHGs, CO2 gas emissions are by far the largest
source.30 CO2 accounts for over eighty percent of American GHG emissions,
making a strategy for substantially reducing CO2 emissions particularly
necessary.31 The energy and transportation sectors are the most noxious
emitters of CO2, as the combustion of fossil fuels (such as coal and petro-
leum derivatives) produces over 5.8 billion metric tons of CO2 annually,
the lion’s share of national GHG output.32 Further, CO2 emissions are
expected to continue to grow as emerging economies, namely India and
China, “fuel economic development with fossil energy.”33 Facing an in-
creased global reliance on fossil fuels, greater CO2 emissions, and the re-
lated negative effects on the global climate change, CCS may be an effective
mitigation strategy.34
B. Carbon Capture and Sequestration as a Mitigation Strategy
CCS has seen increased attention and investment35 largely because
it represents a “bridge technology”36 that may effectively mitigate increased
CO2 emissions while allowing for the continued use of established, cheap,37
and prevalent fossil fuels in energy generation and transportation.38 In
29 Agriculture and Climate Change, OECD AGRIC. MINISTERIAL MEETING (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2157136_43892445_44437010_1_1_1_1,00
.html (stating that in order to limit a global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius
anthropogenic GHG emissions must decrease globally by at least fifty percent).
30 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GREENHOUSE GASES, CLIMATE CHANGE, &
ENERGY POLICY (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/brochures/greenhouse
/Chapter1.htm.
31 Id. The other significant national sources of GHGs are methane at nine percent and
nitrous oxide at five percent. Id.
32 Id. at fig.4.
33 Id. The Department of Energy (“DOE”) expects world CO2 emissions to increase by 1.9
percent annually. Id. Similarly, the IPCC labels income growth and population change as
“drivers” of increased CO2 emissions. IPCC, supra note 1, at 37.
34 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 200.
35 See PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., RL 38801, CARBON CAPTURE AND
SEQUESTRATION 2–5 (2009) (detailing Congressional interest and $14.5 billion in recent
federal funding).
36 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 2–3.
37 THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at ix.
38 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 2; see also Donna M. Attanasio, Surveying the Risks of
Carbon Dioxide: Geological Sequestration and Storage Projects in the United States, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,376, 10,381 (2009) (“GS is intended to be a transitional
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this way, CCS technology would allow for continued use of the extensive
infrastructure39 already in place for using fossil fuels while mitigating their
effects in hopes that long-term, alternative mitigation strategies will be
developed.40 Of the fossil fuels to which CCS may be applied, coal is the
cheapest, and its broad global distribution ensures that it will be a readily
available, and widely used, energy source for years to come.41 The United
States is the second largest global producer of coal,42 using it to provide
about fifty percent of national energy generation43 along with 1.9 billion
metric tons of CO2 annually.44 CCS tied to commercial coal-fired energy
generation presents the readiest, and perhaps most effective, application
of the technology.45
While coal-fired energy plants are the likeliest candidates for
CCS, the process may be utilized to mitigate CO2 emissions from a vari-
ety of fixed-point sources.46 Capturing the CO2 output from all fossil-fuel-
based electricity generation would remove forty-one percent of annual
American carbon emissions, the largest single source proportion of CO2
emissions.47 Applying the process to other large industrial emitters, such
as cement manufacturing, could remove a further 12.8% of annual CO2
emissions.48 The removal of such a large amount of emissions would re-
quire large underground storage spaces,49 and the Department of Energy
mechanism to facilitate continued use of fossil fuels while cleaner methods of energy
production are developed.”).
39 For instance, there are the equivalent of more than five hundred, 500 megawatt coal-
fired power plants in the United States, largely concentrated in the East. THE FUTURE OF
COAL, supra note 11, at ix & 5. The United States had 486 billion short tons of coal in demon-
strated reserves as of January 1, 2010. Coal Reserves Current and Back Issues, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/reserves/reserves.html.
40 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 3. These alternative strategies include
increased energy efficiency, alternative fuel sources, and conservation. Id.
41 THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at ix–x.
42 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 3.
43 Id. at ix.
44 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0573 (2007), EMISSIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 20 tbl.11 (2008).
45 Id. at 17.
46 Id. Ninety-eight percent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions come from fossil fuel combustion,
and all fossil fuel electric power plants are candidates for carbon capture. What is Carbon
Capture?, NAT’L ENERGY & TECH. LAB. (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies
/carbon_seq/FAQs/carbon-capture.html.
47 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. EPA 430-R-11-005, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2009 9 & tbl.es-3, available at http://epa.gov/climatechange
/emissions/usinventoryreport.html.
48 Id.
49 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 204.
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has estimated that the United States and Canada collectively possess
enough “pore space” to sequester over 22,564 billion tons of CO2.50 Thus,
a large-scale, national CCS program could potentially remove sixty per-
cent of annual CO2 emissions, while allowing for current fossil-fuel-based
technologies to remain viable long enough for alternative sources to be
developed. To be effective as a mitigation strategy, such a program would
need to eventually sequester the CO2 emissions from the equivalent of
over 600 large (>1,000 megawatts (“MW”)) coal-fired plants, a massive
undertaking.51
C. CCS Generally
CCS generally involves three steps: capturing the CO2 produced by
either a power plant or industrial source, transporting the CO2 via pipeline
to the injection site, and injecting the CO2 in liquid form into geological for-
mations deep underground.52 The candidate geologic formations include
deep saline formations,53 unmineable coal seams,54 oil and gas reservoirs,55
and basalt formations.56 Essentially, CO2 is captured before it is emitted
into the atmosphere by either a power plant or industrial source, shipped
via pipeline to a well-site, and pumped deep underground for storage.57
This process theoretically removes the harmful effects of fossil fuels while
forestalling their obsolescence. As the CO2 is pumped into the earth in a
“supercritical” liquid state, the geological pressures exerted below 800
meters will act to keep it confined beneath impermeable layers of rock in
a dense, largely immobile state.58 Once in the ground, ninety-nine percent
of the injected gas is expected to stay sequestered for at least 100 years,
and likely for more than 1000.59
50 CARBON SEQUESTRATION ATLAS, supra note 22, at 27–29.
51 THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at 43 (noting that global CO2 emissions stand at 2.5
gigatons of carbon (“GtC”), and CCS at six hundred 1000 MW plants would cover 1 GtC).
52 FOLGER, supra note 35, at 8–9.
53 Most sequestration will occur in saline formations because of their large capacity and
broad distribution. THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at 44.
54 Id. at 44.
55 Id.
56 Introduction to Geologic Storage, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB. (May 22, 2011), http://www
.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/corerd/storage.html.
57 FOLGER, supra note 35, at 1.
58 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 197.
59 THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at 44.
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The technologies required to implement CCS either currently exist
or are in development,60 and various demonstration projects have been
developed to test the method and prove its viability.61 Further, fluids
have been injected into underground pore spaces for years “on a massive
scale” as a part of chemical disposal, enhanced oil recovery, or natural
gas storage.62 However, large scale CCS has not been pursued, and pre-
vious instances where CO2 was pumped underground, such as enhanced
oil recovery (“EOR”) projects,63 were not concerned with permanent
sequestration, monitoring, and storage.64
CO2 capture has been practiced by various industries for decades,
and CO2 has been captured from industrial streams for over eighty years.65
While it has not been applied to energy plants on a wide scale66, CO2
capture, whether post-combustion, pre-combustion, or by oxy-fuel com-
bustion capture, could theoretically operate at eighty-five to ninety-five
percent capture efficiency when applied to these sources.67
Similarly, the technology needed to pump carbon dioxide deep
into the earth, including the transportation and injection of the liquefied
CO2, has previously been developed for EOR.68 EOR originated in Texas
in the 1970s, and seventy-three EOR projects currently exist in the United
States.69 In EOR, gas is pumped into under-producing wells to aid in oil
recovery, but the CO2 is not kept permanently underground, as would be
the case with CCS.70 Currently, 32 million tons of CO2 are pumped into the
ground annually to aid EOR in the United States.71 This CO2 flows through
60 Id. at 43 (However “there do not appear to be unresolvable open technical issues under-
lying these questions . . . [and] the hurdles to answering these questions well appear
manageable and surmountable.”).
61 Attanasio, supra note 38, at 10,378–79.
62 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 200.
63 Jerry R. Fish & Thomas R. Wood, Geologic Carbon Sequestration, Property Rights and
Regulation, 54 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-1, 3-19 (2008) (noting that with EOR, CO2 either
returns with the recovered oil or is vented to the atmosphere).
64 See id.
65 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 108.
66 Id. at 107.
67 Id.
68 Philip M. Marston & Patricia A. Moore, From EOR to COS: The Evolving Legal and
Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 29 ENERGY L. J. 421, 426–27 (2008).
69 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 203.
70 Victoria B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from Coal, 19 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 211, 213 (2009).
71 Attanasio, supra note 38, at 10,378.
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over 2500 kilometers of pipelines, showing the viability of liquefied CO2
transportation to wellheads.72 Essentially, CCS “uses many of the same
technologies that have been developed by the oil and gas industry,”73 and
three large-scale storage projects are currently underway.74 Thus, the tech-
nical components of CCS, capture, transportation, and injection, have been
demonstrated to varying degrees, albeit in limited and largely experimen-
tal ways. While a true CCS program would require thousands of full-scale
projects beyond what has been previously demonstrated,75 technology will
not likely be an impediment to future CCS development. The technology
to implement CCS, while untested on such a large scale, exists, though
ahead of the necessary legal structures.
D. Legal Impediments to CCS
The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that CCS may eventu-
ally capture ninety percent of coal-fired plant emissions.76 While CCS may
therefore represent a vital and viable climate change mitigation strategy,
major impediments to the creation of a national CCS system exist. First,
such a project would be massive in scale. The volume of liquid CO2 po-
tentially produced would be roughly equivalent to the total volume of oil
consumed by the United States, equaling almost twenty million barrels of
liquid CO2 per day, all of it requiring capture, transportation, and storage.77
A national CO2 transportation network would therefore need to be created
to deliver liquefied CO2 from the various emission sources to the injection
points,78 as the largest clusters of emissions sources in the United States
are found in the East and Midwest,79 while many storage basins and pore
space ownership regimes are found in the West.80 The scale and cost of such
72 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 5.
73 Id. at 6.
74 Attanasio, supra note 38, at 10,378–79 (noting the Sleipner project in Norway, the
Weybrun EOR project in Canada and the United States, and the In Salah project in Algeria).
75 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 204.
76 Technologies: Carbon Sequestration, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB. http://www.netl.doe.gov
/technologies/carbon_seq (follow “Read more” at bottom of page) (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
77 THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at ix.
78 INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, REGULATION OF CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 9
(2008), available at http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_CCS.pdf (noting that a 1000
MW coal-fired plant produces five to eight million tons of CO2 annually).
79 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 83.
80 See id. at 181.
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a network is uncertain, and “[a]s CO2 pipelines get longer, the state-by-
state siting approval process may become complex and protracted, and may
face public opposition.”81
Second, and most importantly for the purposes of this Note, “[i]t is
unlikely that CCS will flourish as long as there is legal uncertainty sur-
rounding the acquisition of storage space, the injection process, and liability
for post-injection incidents.”82 Specifically, legal issues regarding ownership
of the underground pore spaces must be resolved before significant invest-
ment in CCS occurs. These pore spaces exist over 800 meters below the
surface and are commonly found at depths of over one kilometer.83 Potential
carbon “storage basins” can cover vast tracks of land, crossing property
borders, state lines, and national boundaries, complicating efforts to coor-
dinate the large numbers (potentially thousands) of surface landholders
over a single reservoir.84 Although the storage basins that CO2 will be
pumped into are vast, the stored supercritical gas can be expected to mi-
grate laterally through the pore spaces for over 100 kilometers,85 making
any adherence to traditional property boundaries, or even differing state
regulatory or statutory regimes, difficult at best.86 Complicating matters,
the property rights governing these pore spaces, the focus of this Note, have
been infrequently and indecisively treated by courts, and may vary by
jurisdiction.87 As Federal regulations, and most state laws, currently “do
not contemplate the infinite geologic storage of gas,” the most likely “major
impediments to the widespread deployment of CCS are not scientific or
technological, but legal and regulatory.”88
The sort of large-scale CCS needed to mitigate continued and in-
creased reliance on fossil fuels cannot begin without a clear delineation of
the legal property interests involved.89 Thus, the major barriers to CCS are
legal, not technical, and involve issues of liability, storage field unitization,
81 PAUL W. PARFOMAK & PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34316, PIPELINES FOR
CARBON DIOXIDE (CO2) CONTROL: NETWORK NEEDS AND COST UNCERTAINTIES SUMMARY
(2008), available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL34316.
82 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 4.
83 THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at 44.
84 See id. at 54–55; Fish & Wood, supra note 63, at 3-11 (explaining that as thousands of
owners may overlay any one storage basin, obtaining the requisite property rights or
exercising eminent domain to secure use of the entire field may be extremely difficult).
85 Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of CO2 Captured
from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L. J. 443, 454 (2007).
86 Id. at 477.
87 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 256.
88 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 4.
89 See Fish & Wood, supra note 63, at 3-16.
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trespass, and takings.90 To enable this massive undertaking, “future CCS
operators must be able to access millions of acres of deep subsurface ‘pore
space’ roughly a kilometer below the earth’s surface to sequester the CO2
for hundreds to thousands of years.”91 This raises questions of extraor-
dinarily long-term liability for the pore space owner, creating a situation
where governments may be “the only entities that can make credible
commitments over such long storage time periods.”92 Further, as the gas
migrates laterally underground, trespass or nuisance claims could arise
among thousands of surface property owners.93 If the pore space is con-
sidered to be part of the private surface estate, ownership of these massive
storage basins will accordingly need to be combined. This pore space unifi-
cation presents a daunting proposition, both economically and procedurally,
given the physical expanse and potential thousands of surface owners.
The likelihood that gas plumes will migrate across individual state lines
post-injection has even prompted one commenter to declare that state
regulation of CCS is illogical, as the “pore space, especially saline aquifers,
does not stop at state borders.”94 Additionally, takings claims may rise
from efforts to site pipelines and wellheads or from the eventual migra-
tion of government-owned (or mandated) sequestered gas into neighboring
pore spaces.95
These swirling legal questions need to be clarified to allow for the
rapid and expansive development of CCS. The ownership of the pore spaces
needs to be clearly defined to enable investment and development on a
large scale.96 Unhelpfully, the common law has infrequently and incoher-
ently addressed the subject of pore space ownership, leaving developers,
property owners, regulators, and states largely in the dark when it comes
to pore space ownership.97 To rectify this, this Note proposes that the pore
90 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 4 (“While scientists are confident that it will soon be
possible to build or retrofit ‘capture-ready’ power plants that can safely store vast quantities
of CO2 underground, there is no consistent legal framework to regulate these projects.”).
91 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and
Property Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 363 (2010) [hereinafter Klass & Wilson 2010].
92 INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 78, at 7.
93 Moore, supra note 85, at 477–79.
94 Decesar, supra note 7, at 266.
95 See Moore, supra note 85, at 479 (noting that as “government could not operate if it had
to pay for every encroachment,” ownership rights of the subsurface pore spaces need to
be clarified).
96 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 4.
97 See Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore Space?, 9 WYO.
L. REV. 97, 99 (2009) (applying the common law doctrine of cujus est solum, ejus est usque
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space should be seen as a public resource, similar to the navigable airspace.
To facilitate this, existing common law and statutory conceptions of private
pore space ownership will need to be adjusted to account for the contem-
porary social and environmental demands surrounding climate change,
freeing the heretofore atomized pore space for public use.
II. DEFINING THE PORE SPACE RIGHTS
A. Reconfiguring Subsurface Pore Space Rights at Common Law
As noted above, CCS raises important legal questions that must
be answered before a national, widespread program capable of effectively
sequestering and mitigating large amounts of CO2 emissions can begin.
Most significantly, the legal status of the subsurface pore space estate
must be clarified, as constitutional takings issues,98 as well as trespass-
related torts,99 may be implicated if a “protectable property interest in
subsurface pore space” is either found to exist at common law or statutorily
established.100 Uncertainty over the rightful ownership of the deep pore
spaces results from both inconsistent treatment by the courts101 and from
ad coelum et ad inferos and deciding the surface estate owns the pore space); Flatt, supra
note 70, at 233 (“There is no clear consensus on whether the ownership of the pore space
lies with the surface estate or the mineral estate.”); Moore, supra note 85, at 477 (noting that
“there is no case law addressing sequestered CO2” and applying the common law by analogy);
Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 19 (noting that the cases that have dealt with subsurface
storage “illustrate the lack of a consistent national view of pore space ownership . . .
[v]arious courts . . . have awarded gas storage rights to surface and mineral holders alike.”);
IOGCC, supra note 24, at 16–19 (showing the variety of treatment of pore space ownership
in the relevant case law, but noting that the surface owner generally wins).
98 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982) (“[O]ur cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
[physical] occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”).
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965) (declaring that trespass may be committed
“on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth.”). However, subsection 2 of the Restatement
recognizes the limits placed by United States v. Causby (discussed below), as flights by
aircraft are excepted from the rule if they do not invade the “immediate reaches” of the land
or substantially interfere with the owner’s “use and enjoyment.” Id.
100 Alexandra Klass, Federal Task Force on Carbon Capture and Sequestration Will Need
to Grapple With Property Rights Law, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM BLOG (May 11, 2010),
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm.
101 See supra note 97 and discussion infra Part II.C.1.
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traditional common law conceptions of private property ownership. Pore
space ownership must be clarified, as CCS depends upon a clear delineation
of the subsurface property interests involved.102 Courts103 and scholars104
have infrequently and inconsistently treated the pore spaces, which has
driven individual states to legislatively define pore space ownership
rights,105 potentially Balkanizing its legal and regulatory development at
the outset.106 To get ahead of this atomistic state-led development,107 the
difficulties presented by the common law, in both its assumed preference
for private ownership of the subsurface and disjointed treatment of sub-
surface rights, must be addressed.
The legal uncertainties hindering effective CCS implementation are
therefore twofold, and each must be addressed before CCS can flourish.
First, the outdated property law maxim of cujus est solum, ejus est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos (roughly translated as “whoever owns the soil owns
up to heaven and down to hell”)108 must be refined to render CCS econom-
ically feasible. Second, the inconsistent treatment109 of underground storage
in the case law must be replaced with a clear legislative standard,110 as a
handful of states have attempted to do, albeit imperfectly.111 Ultimately,
there is widespread recognition that subsurface property rights must be
102 FISH & MARTIN, supra note 18, at 1 (noting that while “[c]arbon sequestration cannot
occur absent the right to inject and store carbon dioxide” in pore spaces, this right is ill-
defined).
103 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 19 (“The various holdings . . . illustrate the lack of a
consistent national view of pore space ownership . . . . Various courts, utilizing various
factors, have awarded gas storage rights to surface and mineral holders alike.”).
104 Those scholars that have analyzed the issue have often viewed CCS as analogous to
natural gas storage and have granted pore space ownership to the surface owner. Marston
& Moore, supra note 68, at 475. However, there is a lack of consensus on whether the
surface owner retains the pore spaces as well. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
105 See also discussion infra Part II.B (detailing and critiquing state definitions of pore
space ownership). See generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-183 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-31-03 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152 (West 2009); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 120.002 (West 2009).
106 See Decesar, supra note 7, at 266 (“[H]aving fifty different programs . . . would lead
to unnecessary confusion and delay.”).
107 Klass & Wilson 2010, supra note 91, at 382.
108 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1834 (9th ed. 2009).
109 Underground property rights are respected to varying degrees. CCSREG PROJECT,
CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION: FRAMING THE ISSUES FOR REGULATION 57 (2009),
available at http://www.ccsreg.org/pdf/CCSReg_3_9.pdf.
110 See Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 14.
111 Id. at 29–31.
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clarified,112 and unified,113 before truly effective CCS can begin. As this Note
attempts to show, the “unity” (addressed through a reconfiguring of the
cujus est solum doctrine) and “clarity” (addressed through legislation)
hurdles facing CCS will be most ably addressed through public ownership
of the pore spaces.
1. Limiting the Subterranean Reach of Property:
Applying United States v. Causby to the Pore Spaces
The primary common law impediment to CCS is the traditional
property law maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos
(“cujus est solum”), which declares that the surface fee simple owner’s
control stretches from the outer reaches of the heavens to the center of
the earth.114 Specifically, this questionably ancient doctrine115 must be
revised through analogy to navigable airspace rights to enable modern
technology (in the form of CCS) to address contemporary climate change
and provide a necessary public benefit. While seemingly old (and in such
weighty Latin), the cujus est solum doctrine is far from absolute, and may
be limited, as the United States Supreme Court revealed in United States
v. Causby.116 By applying the analysis in Causby to the deep pore space,
private subsurface rights may be bounded just as the vertical reach of
112 Delissa Hayano, Guarding the Viability of Coal & Coal-Fired Power Plants: A Road Map
for Wyoming’s Cradle to Grave Regulation of Geologic Cosequestration, 9 WYO. L. REV. 139,
143 (2009) (“[T]he determination of the ownership of subsurface pore space is an essential
step in creating a statutory and regulatory framework for the development of [CCS]
projects.”); Anderson, supra note 97, at 98 (“There are no technical or physical barriers to
[geologic sequestration]. . . . The only thing that stands in the way of progress at the
moment is policy.”) (quoting THE PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, LTD., FUNDAMENTALS OF
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE TECHNOLOGY 38–39 (Tom Nicholls ed., 2007)).
113 The IOGCC, which has developed a model CCS statute for states, believes that “the amal-
gamation of property rights is absolutely necessary to properly permit, construct and operate
a carbon dioxide storage project.” IOGCC, supra note 24, at 33 n.3.
114 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1834. Interestingly, BLACK’S further notes that this doctrine
encompasses ownership of “hard” minerals like coal, but not “fugacious” minerals like oil
or gas. Id.
115 John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 983 (2008)
(“[The principle] was not a principle of Roman law—despite the Latin phrasing of the
maxim—nor was the theory recognized in early common law.”) (citation omitted). There
is “surprisingly little scholarship concerning the downward extent of a surface owner’s
property rights as a general matter,” leading one author to believe “that the center of the
earth approach is mere poetic hyperbole, not law.” Id. at 980 n.1, 981.
116 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946) (Congress declared airspace above “minimum safe altitudes”
of flight to be “subject to a public right of freedom” under the Air Commerce Act of 1926.
See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568, 574 (1926) (codified amended at 49
U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (1994))).
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ownership was limited to provide for the exigencies of air travel.117 Indeed,
modern CCS faces many of the same private property challenges that the
nascent air travel industry faced in Causby, where “every transcontinental
flight would [have] subject[ed] the operator to countless trespass suits,”
threatening the economic and legal feasibility of an eminently public
good.118 To further the development of CCS as a public good providing
national benefits, traditional property conceptions must give way to mod-
ern realities, just as they did in Causby.
In Causby, Justice Douglas upheld a takings claim by a private citi-
zen against low-flying military aircraft, but also found an upper limit to the
plaintiff’s property interest in light of the Air Commerce Act.119 The plain-
tiffs claimed that their chicken farm was rendered useless by incessant low-
level flights, while the government argued that flights within the navigable
airspace were not a physical invasion, and therefore not a taking.120 Directly
addressing the cujus est solum doctrine in the context of technological inno-
vation and the modern development of air travel, the Court found that the
public desire to facilitate air travel (as expressed though the Air Commerce
Act) limited the upward reach of property.121 The Court chipped away at the
formerly infinite vertical bounds of private property, holding that cujus est
solum “has no place in the modern world,” because “[t]he air is a public
highway, as Congress has declared.”122 Therefore, Causby represents the
proposition that the common law tradition of unbounded vertical property
limits may (literally) be brought to Earth by way of technological change
and modern necessity, if the public desires it. The analogy to climate
change is clear, as contemporary technological innovation (in the way of
CCS) and social interests (mitigating climate change) have conspired to
make the need for widespread access to the deep pore spaces a necessary
public good at least equivalent to air travel.
For a salutary reconfiguring of subsurface property rights to
occur, private ownership of the deep pore space must therefore be reex-
amined by applying the lessons of Causby. Private trespass suits threat-
ened the economic and practical viability of air travel if the court did not
find an upward limitation of property rights.123 Analogously, unitization
117 Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 266–67.
120 Id. at 258–60.
121 Id. at 261 (“Common sense revolt[ed] at the idea” of private property claims encumbering
the public use of the airways.).
122 Id.
123 Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
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of the requisite pore space estates (if found to belong to the surface
owner), or potential liability related to subsurface trespass claims,124
could render CCS economically infeasible.125 Indeed, “absent unrealisti-
cally high electricity prices or . . . subsidy, pore space currently has no
net-positive, intrinsic economic value . . . [that can] be passed along to
property owners.”126 This would seemingly refute the prospect of private
pore space development, or the presence of some incentive to privately
unitize the space. Therefore, amalgamation of pore space rights though
either private purchase or the exercise of eminent domain represents a
fundamental obstacle to CCS development.127 Traditional application of
the cujus est solum doctrine would likely cripple private development of
CCS, as the economic incentive,128 or even ability,129 to privately develop
the pore space would be extremely limited, or nonexistent. The states that
have addressed pore space ownership—Montana, Wyoming, and North
Dakota—have effectively conceded the lack of a continuing profit motive
(and heavy burden of infinite liability) by allowing for the transfer of future
site ownership and liability to the state.130 As private development of CCS
124 See Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface is Not His Castle, 49
WASHBURN L.J. 247, 255 (2010) [hereinafter Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”] (noting
that while subsurface trespass should be limited, the surface and mineral estate owners
have a right to protect against subsurface trespass that causes “actual and substantial
damages regarding their right of subsurface use.”).
125 R. Lee Gresham, Geologic CO2 Sequestration and Subsurface Property Rights: A Legal
and Economic Analysis iv (Dec. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie Mellon
University), available at http://repository.cmu.edu/dissertations/8.
126 Id. at 169. Even leasing the required pore space would bring exorbitant costs, as fields
may incur $13 million in rent per year, if priced similarly to current natural gas storage
rates. Fish & Wood, supra note 63, at 3-17. When this is multiplied by the likely infinite
term of storage, the costs quickly mount.
127 Private industry is “naturally risk adverse,” and may balk at the unsettled economic
and legal circumstances surrounding the pore space. Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 4.
Furthermore, “the cost of acquiring pore space rights could significantly limit economically
available sequestration capacity” if the pore space is privately owned. Gresham, supra
note 125, at 135.
128 Hayano, supra note 112, at 155 (“[W]ithout further development of carbon markets and
monetization of carbon credits or increased demand for CO2 as a commodity, revenue
generation via sequestration remains uncertain.”).
129 Fish & Wood, supra note 63, at 3-16 (“We question whether . . . individual landowner
negotiations, and subsequent myriad condemnation proceedings can be completed quickly
enough to allow for rapid deployment of [CCS].”). Further, individual CCS projects may
underlie thousands of square miles of thousands of individual surface owners, creating
thousands of atomized holdings in storage basins. Id. at 3-15.
130 See supra note 20. Both Montana and North Dakota allow transfer of the storage basin
title to the state without payment or compensation, perhaps conceding their true value. Id.
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is likely impractical due to the extreme economic and contractual burdens
inherent in unitizing thousands of property interests,131 cujus est solum
should be limited with regard to the deep subsurface.
Importantly, the Causby decision established limits upon the cujus
est solum doctrine with regard to airspace.132 However, the Court’s decision
did not completely eviscerate the property owner’s interests in the airspace.
Justice Douglas created a private use boundary, holding that “[t]he land-
owner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can
occupy or use in connection with the land,” even if it was not currently
physically occupied.133 Public uses above a certain regulatory threshold
(here minimum altitudes of safe air travel) would not be considered a
taking if they were not “so immediate and direct as to subtract from the
owner’s full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of
it.”134 This private “full enjoyment” limiting principle is clearly applicable
by analogy to the prospective public use of pore spaces, which may be more
than one kilometer beneath the earth’s surface.135 Indeed, “virtually all
subsurface activities by humans—such as building foundations, mines,
and water wells—occur in the very shallow crust within 1000 feet of the
surface.”136 Thus, the majority of full human exploitation of the subsurface
ends well above the depths of the pore spaces,137 potentially avoiding con-
flicts with beneficial private use of the subsurface. As a result, the public
may have access to the deep pore space where that public use does not
interfere with the owner’s full enjoyment of the subsurface.138 This recon-
figuring of the subsurface rights is suggested by Causby, as the Court rec-
ognized that the right to exclusive private control would cede at some point
131 See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 1163, 1165
(1999) (noting that excessive private property fragmentation can inhibit contractual collec-
tivization due to “high transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases”).
132 Klass & Wilson 2010, supra note 91, at 388 (“The Court . . . not[ed] that the airplane is
‘part of the modern environment of life,’ the inconveniences it causes are not normally com-
pensable under the Fifth Amendment, and the airspace . . . is part of the ‘public domain.’ ”).
133 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
134 Id. at 265.
135 THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at 44.
136 Sprankling, supra note 115, at 994.
137 Gresham, supra note 125, at 18; Sprankling, supra note 115, at 994 (“Productive human
activity is possible only within the shallowest portion of the earth’s crust.”). Mineral and re-
source extraction could be protected as well. See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
138 See Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 124, at 281 (advocating for limitation
of subsurface trespass, and noting that if traditional subsurface trespass law is applied
to the pore space, CCS could be “greatly hindered”).
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(to be legislatively determined) beyond which the private owner could bene-
ficially use.139 Modern property owners do not require exclusive control of
the pore space to extract all reasonable economic benefit.
The cujus est solum maxim, founded upon ancient, inaccurate
notions of the deep subsurface’s utility to the surface owner, may be
downwardly constrained just as it was limited above.140 Beneficial deep
subsurface uses almost uniformly involve mineral extraction and storage
or chemical waste disposal,141 and private subsurface uses could be leg-
islatively prioritized as part of a state CCS regime.142 However, such
public/private use conflicts may be avoided, as the subsurface spaces
most amenable to CCS, unmineable coal seams, saline aquifers and old
oil and gas fields, are attractive partly because conflicts with resource
extraction would be minimized.143 These spaces were previously bene-
ficially used,144 or may not be able to be put to a productive use,145 per-
haps clearing the way for CCS without infringing upon private use and
enjoyment. Public use of the pore spaces may therefore be bounded in a
way that preserves private economic interests, reducing conflicts with
the surface owner’s “full enjoyment” of the land.
The cujus est solum doctrine creates a fragmentation problem,
revealed by Causby, where “millions of long, narrow subsurface parcels—
somewhat like pieces of string— . . . interfere with new technologies such
as [CCS] . . . that would occupy large subsurface regions.”146 The deep
pore space may be effectively used only through the unification of the
pore space through public ownership. As the discussion has shown, this
may be achieved by placing a lower boundary on protectable private
139 Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
140 Sprankling, supra note 115, at 993.
141 Id. at 994.
142 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152 (West 2009) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed
to change or alter the common law as of July 1, 2008, as it relates to the rights belonging
to, or the dominance of, the mineral estate.”).
143 IPCC CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE, supra note 10, at 215 (“Depleted fields will not be
adversely affected by CO2 (having already contained hydrocarbons) and if hydrocarbon
fields are still in production, a CO2 storage scheme can be optimized to enhance oil (or
gas) production.”).
144 Id. at 221 (noting that it is assumed CCS can occur after oil and gas reserves have been
depleted in the reservoir).
145 Deep saline aquifers, one of the largest potential CCS storage formations, contain briny
water “unsuitable for agriculture or human consumption.” Id. at 217.
146 Sprankling, supra note 115, at 1029.
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property interests in the subsurface.147 This conforms not only with our
advancing conceptions of subsurface geology and public necessity, but
with the limits of private utility.148 The physical and practical constraints
intrinsic to deep subsurface private ownership were simply not contem-
plated by the cujus est solum doctrine,149 and need to be reconsidered.
Recognizing this, the government may indeed be the “most useful manager”
of the pore space in the CCS context, as private ownership could create a
market where the owners were both too numerous and too small to effec-
tively operate and allocate the storage resource.150 Relying upon antiquated
notions of the earth’s interior would irrationally hamper a socially bene-
ficial use of the subsurface pore space, just as ancient conceptions of air-
space ownership would have grounded air travel.151 As the pore spaces have
been shown to largely fall below the reach of private enjoyment and use
of the subsurface,152 the effects of public pore space ownership would not
147 See supra Part II.A.
148 Sprankling, supra note 115, at 1024 (noting that “the deep subsurface is largely incapable
of possession in the traditional sense” due to the fluid nature of the mantle, and extremes
in heat and pressure).
149 Indeed, the doctrine even fails in the comparable context of resource extraction (“The
principles of private ownership which involve dominion on the part of the landowner over
all substances from the center of the earth to the heavens were inadequate to solve the
problems of a substance under the earth, which would migrate to points of lower pressure
caused by punctures of the reservoir by drilling.”). Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488
So.2d 955, 962 (La. 1986) (citing H. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 415 (1949)).
150 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 719 (1986). Economic utility is not the sole right that
inheres in private property; others include the “right to possess, use and dispose of it.”
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). However, as the above
discussion notes, private “possession” and “use” without unification of the deep pore space
may be infeasible due to physical and geological realities. See supra Part I.
151 See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008).
(“Wheeling an airplane across the surface of one’s property without permission is a
trespass; flying the plane through the airspace two miles above the property is not. Lord
Coke, who pronounced the maxim, did not consider the possibility of airplanes. But
neither did he imagine oil wells. The law of trespass need no more be the same two miles
below the surface than two miles above.”).
152 In the deepest subsurface trespass litigation in the United States, the plaintiff com-
plained about “4 or 5 feet” of a drill’s intrusion into his subsurface property at a depth of
11,000 ft. Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 957. Using facts similar to CCS, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana found that the required unitization of common mineral pools did not permit
an individual landowner “to rely on a concept of individual ownership to thwart the common
right to the resource as well as the important state interest in developing its resources
fully and efficiently.” Id. at 964.
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unduly burden private property rights.153 Rather, unifying the pore space
through public ownership would put it to an eminently productive public
use that would otherwise be unavailable.154 The overly fragmented pore
space must be “[re]-scaled for productive use,” and granted to the public to
enable the expeditious and widespread development of CCS.155
B. Reconciling Public Ownership of the Pore Space with
Takings Claims
Granting the pore space to the public through a reconfiguring of the
cujus est solum doctrine raises the specter of takings, specifically with re-
gards to the per se physical takings rule elucidated by the Court in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.156 While this Note argues that
the pore space, like the navigable airspace, is inherently public due to de-
ficiencies in the common law’s anachronistic conception of property, the
issue must be addressed. In fact, at first blush, public ownership of the
pore space and the seemingly innocuous requirement that a television cable
must be installed on a building raise similar issues. Both deal with osten-
sibly public goods, climate change and cable television (though not equally
“good”), and effect a physical appropriation that “has only minimal eco-
nomic impact on the owner.”157 However, as argued above, the subsurface
pore space physically falls below the limits of private beneficial use, and
should not be considered to be part of the private surface estate amenable
to a takings claim.158 Thus, this Note supposes that a takings claim would
153 Indeed, courts have found that similar subsurface activities, such as EOR, underground
waste disposal, and water storage and recharge, do not rise to the level of subsurface tres-
pass as the property owner could not demonstrate actual harm or interference with the
use and full enjoyment of the land, echoing the limitation set by Causby. Gresham, supra
note 125, at 111–12.
154 The public trust doctrine has similarly been expanded from public ownership of navigable
waterways to include “parks, historical areas, cemeteries, archeological sites and remains,
and works of art.” William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-
Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 402 (1997). This doctrine allows resources
to be preserved through public ownership to further a public good. See generally Joseph
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
155 See Heller, supra note 131, at 1166.
156 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 417, 434–35 (1982).
157 Id. at 435.
158 The Fifth Amendment “protects rather than creates property interests,” and the
“existence of a property interest is determined by reference to ‘existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source.’ ” Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524
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fail as no protectable, useable private property has been taken. Flawed
doctrines alleging private property ownership of infinite vertical reach
must give way to evolving realities and social necessities.159 The cujus est
solum doctrine wrongly supposed infinite subterranean utility to a private
owner,160 a takings claim that rests upon this outdated notion should not
succeed. Ideally, this reconfiguring of the pore space would be instanta-
neously and universally applauded, but in reality, any such grant of the
pore space to the public would surely raise a takings challenge.
In deciding an equivalent takings claim based on public use of the
navigable airspace, the Causby Court seemingly viewed the Air Commerce
Act’s creation of the public airspace as determinative, and consequently
endorsed limits to the vertical reach of private property.161 An equivalent
grant of the pore space to the public should be seen as equally valid, as it
furthers a public good while avoiding conflict with the private owner’s use
and enjoyment of the subsurface. Despite the apt analogy, a takings chal-
lenge is likely to accompany any such grant of the pore space. Yet, even if
a taking of the pore space is successfully asserted under Loretto, it may not
be compensable.162 Private, atomistic ownership of the pore space has little
inherent economic utility,163 and takings claims demanding pore space-
based compensation may perhaps best be compared to previous challenges
to IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts) programs. In these cases,
the Supreme Court recognized that while individual client trust accounts
may not generate sufficient interest to be of an “economically realizable
value to its owner,” forced collectivization and public use of the aggregated
U.S. 156, 164 (1998). If that understanding changes, as it did with airspace and should
with pore space, the Constitution could accommodate it.
159 In the context of subsurface trespass, Professor Owen Anderson has advanced a similar
theory, stating that subsurface “[t]respass is a wrong that should continue to evolve to meet
the needs of modern society, including more extensive subsurface land use.” Anderson,
Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 124, at 253.
160 See Sprankling, supra note 115, at 992.
161 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“The air is a public highway, as
Congress has declared.”).
162 A regulatory taking claim is unlikely, as the economic value in a limited slice of a
subsurface storage basin is negligible, failing to rise to the level required by Lucas. Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). The limited utility may also
deny the prospect of interference with any reasonable “investment-backed expectations”
under the Penn Central balancing test. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 234 (2003)
(“Under such an analysis, however, it is clear that there would be no taking because the
transaction had no adverse economic impact on petitioners and did not interfere with any
investment-backed expectation.”).
163 See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
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interest may still be a taking.164 Despite this, the Court deemed the tak-
ing to be non-compensable.165 Real value and utility could be realized only
through a unification of private property through IOLTA programs.166
However, this increased collective value was not the basis for compensation.
In determining the “just compensation” owed for the taking of negligibly
valuable private property to further a public good, the Court instructed that
“the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.”167
Following this rationale, the compensation required with regard to private
pore space ownership may indeed be zero.168 Aggregation of fractionated
private interests can therefore confer previously unavailable utility,169
facilitating socially productive activity while perhaps not incurring takings-
related compensation.
Therefore, potential takings claims related to the public ownership
of the pore space may fail for two reasons: either the pore space falls below
any protectable private property interest (following Causby), or it does not
represent a compensable private property interest in its disaggregated
state. If the Causby analogy is accepted, and the cujus est solum doctrine
is accepted as an archaic formulation, the downward reach of private prop-
erty may be limited. Further, if the unification of the property interest is
what confers value and utility,170 the private owner has not lost a com-
pensable property interest. The underlying motivation for unifying the pore
space flows from these rationales, and attempts to prevent fragmented
private ownership from negating the pore space’s central role in CCS and
climate change mitigation.171 The unity of the pore space confers its
164 Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998).
165 Brown, 538 U.S. at 237.
166 Id. at 230.
167 Id. at 236 (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
168 See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (noting that the economic value of
privately owned pore space may be minimal).
169 Scholars have termed the loss of utility through excessive private property fragmen-
tation the “tragedy of the anticommons.” Heller, supra note 131, at 1166 (“If too many people
gain rights to use or exclude, then bargaining among owners may break down. With too
many owners of property fragments, resources become prone to waste either through overuse
in a commons or through underuse in an anticommons.”).
170 See Sprankling, supra note 115, at 1025.
171 This concept of valid, forced unitization in the face of private property is not new to the
subsurface, where gas or oil reservoir unitization is often required to protect the public
resource. While traditional conceptions of property suggest dominion and exclusive control,
forced pool unitization “infringe[s] on the usual rights of ownership” to prevent the “tragedy
of the commons” from engendering excessive waste of a finite resource. Nunez v. Wainoco
Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 961–69 (La. 1986).
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utility,172 and private ownership may be incapable of unitizing the pore
spaces on a scale large enough to advance meaningful climate mitigation
through CCS.173 Therefore, just as the law has recognized the validity of
publicly mandated unitization of private property interests to enable re-
source extraction,174 air travel,175 and the provisions of legal services,176 it
may do so to promote CCS as well.177
C. Common Law Uncertainty and the Inapplicability of
Available Examples
1. Legal Uncertainty
Limiting the cujus est solum doctrine through a legislative grant
of the pore spaces to the public provides a possible solution to the “unity”
problem facing CCS development. However, the “clarity” problem, born of
the inconsistent legal treatment of the pore space across jurisdictions, must
be examined as well. As courts have variously granted the pore space to the
surface or mineral estate, while inconsistently enforcing the cujus est solum
doctrine with regard to subsurface trespass, legal uncertainty faces pro-
spective CCS developers. This uncertainty should be clarified through a
clear legislative definition of pore space ownership. The inconsistencies
in the case law with regard to subsurface ownership have been examined
before, more ably and in more detail than will be done here.178 However,
examining the inconsistency is not important for what it reveals about sub-
surface ownership,179 but rather to show that without a clear legislative
172 See discussion supra Part I.A.
173 See THE FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 11, at 43 (noting that CCS may be the only current
technology capable of reducing emissions at the level needed, and would need to sequester
the equivalent of the emissions from over six hundred 1000 MW coal-fired plants); Heller,
supra note 131, at 1165 (noting property collectivization bargaining difficulties); Fish &
Wood, supra note 63, at 3-15 (“It is possible that thousands of individual owners will overlie
the CO2 plume from each facility.”). Some proposals have even focused on developing CCS
only under state-owned lands to avoid private unitization issues. Lydia Gonzalez Gromatzky
& Peter T. Gregg, Carbon Storage: Texas Stakes Its Claim, 25 NAT’L RESOURCES & ENV’T
21, 23 (2010).
174 See Heller, supra note 131, at 1165–66.
175 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 528 U.S. 216, 233 (2003).
176 See id. at 221.
177 See id. at 237.
178 See generally Anderson, supra note 97; Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 124;
Fish & Wood, supra note 63; Klass & Wilson, supra note 6; Reisinger et al., supra note 8.
179 The available analogies may not be apt comparisons to CCS. See infra notes 190–99
and accompanying text.
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definition placing the pore space in the public trust, subsurface ownership
rights will vary arbitrarily by jurisdiction.
Specifically, the common law has inconsistently dealt with both
whether the surface owner retains ownership of the pore spaces when the
mineral estate has been severed (revealing whether they are an intrinsic
part of the surface estate),180 and whether the surface owner possesses
a right to excludability when the alleged pore space trespass has produced
no real harm.181 As the various holdings reveal,182 states have inconsis-
tently applied the cujus est solum doctrine in the context of subsurface
property rights, removing even the limited utility of this bright line rule.183
180 Compare Ellis v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 450 F. Supp. 412, 421 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (noting that
mineral rights are “an incorporeal interest analogous to a profit to hunt and fish” and do
not “convey the stratum of rock containing the pore spaces”), and Int’l Salt Co. v. Geostow,
878 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1989) (“International Salt has a fee simple interest in the salt only
and does not have a separate fee interest in the excavation cavity or containing chamber.”),
with Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 301 (1891) (“How could the defendant
own the coal absolutely and in fee-simple, and not own the space it occupied? Or how is it
possible to conceive of such a thing as the ownership of the space independently of the
coal?”), and Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262, 274 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) rev’d on other
grounds, 817 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1991) (“Thus, the fee mineral owners retain a property
ownership, right and interest after the underground storage facility—here, a cavern—
had been created.”).
181 Compare Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 963 (La. 1986) (“Like the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, we conclude that the established principles of private ownership,
already found inadequate in Louisiana to deal with the problems of subsurface fugacious
minerals . . . need not necessarily be applied to other property concepts, like trespass.”),
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008) (“The law of
trespass need no more be the same two miles below the surface than two miles above.”),
and Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996) (“[Appellant’s] subsurface
ownership rights are limited. As the discussion in Willoughby Hills makes evident, owner-
ship rights in today’s world are not so clear-cut as they were before the advent of airplanes
and injection wells.”), with Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Nat’l Gas
Storage Easement, 620 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio 1993) (finding just compensation is due if there is
sufficient recoverable subsurface interest), and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 64 (West 2010)
(“The owner of land in fee has the right to the surface and to everything permanently situ-
ated beneath or above it.”).
182 See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
183 The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been con-
sidered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.” Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). However, this bright
line seemingly blurs the deeper one that delves into the subsurface, as physical harm and
interference with full enjoyment becomes remote. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268
S.W.3d at 11 (“It is important to note, however, that [Plaintiff]’s claim of trespass does not
entitle him to nominal damages (which he has not sought). He must prove actual injury.”);
W. Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 970 (Okla. 1950) (finding
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Therefore, developers in Oklahoma may find they can purchase the pore
space as part of the mineral estate,184 while storage basins across the border
in Texas may be controlled by the surface estate.185 Similarly, the enforce-
ment of subsurface trespass may stop186 and start187 randomly at jurisdic-
tional boundaries. Thus, even though most jurisdictions place the pore
space with the surface estate,188 presumably granting surface owners the
right to exclude, various courts have declined to find liability for sub-
surface trespass where no harm has occurred.189 As a result, potential
liability for laterally migrating sequestered CO2 could vary arbitrarily as
the gas crossed state lines. CCS developers would be hard pressed to de-
termine uniform property rules that applied from field to field, as owner-
ship and exposure to liability seemingly vary at random. In light of these
inconsistencies, the legal environment surrounding the pore space may
not provide a solid footing for private development.190 A grant of the pore
space to the public would rectify this by providing needed clarity.
Clearly, the ownership of the pore space cannot vary across geolog-
ically arbitrary jurisdictional lines. Widespread development requires legal
consistency.191 Causby should therefore be applied to the pore space through
legislative action to promote uniformity. Disappointingly, legislative defini-
tions of the pore space have been attempted in only a few states,192 leaving
potential CCS storage basins at the inconsistent whim of state subsur-
face common law. Legislation clearly granting the pore space to the public
no liability for subsurface trespass where injected saltwater merely mingled in an abandoned
well with other saltwater, causing no actual damage). See generally Anderson, Subsurface
“Trespass,” supra note 124, at 248 (arguing that subsurface trespass claims should be limited
similarly to airspace claims, and only allowed where actual harm has occurred).
184 Ellis, 450 F. Supp. at 421.
185 Mapco, Inc., 808 S.W.2d at 274.
186 Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 991 (limiting subsurface trespass under the Causby rationale).
187 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 64 (West 2010) (embracing the cujus est solum doctrine).
188 Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 124, at 255 (“[I]n most jurisdictions, title
to subsurface pore spaces rests with the surface owner, not the mineral owners.”).
189 Chance, 670 N.E.2d. at 993 (“Even assuming that the injectate had laterally migrated . . .
we find that some type of physical damages or interference with use must have been dem-
onstrated for appellants to recover for a trespass.”); FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Texas Nat’l
Resource Conservation Comm’n, No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183, at *4 (Tex. Ct.
App. Feb. 6, 2003) (“[S]ome measure of harm must accompany the migration for there to
be impairment.”).
190 See Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 4 (noting that “[i]ndustry is naturally risk-averse,”
and will perhaps balk at subsurface legal uncertainty).
191 Id. at 43.
192 See infra Part III.
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would rectify the inconsistency problem, statutorily reinforcing and clarify-
ing a downward limit to surface ownership that has been heretofore incon-
sistently recognized by courts. Enigmatically, decisions denying instances
of subsurface trespass show that Causby has indeed infected judicial con-
ceptions of subsurface property,193 and the formerly bright line rule of
“heaven to earth” ownership is clearly eroding.194 While this development
may support the thesis of this Note, it has bred inconsistency across state
lines with regard to pore space ownership. An ad hoc, judicial reconfiguring
of the pore space would be detrimental to CCS, and uniform legislative defi-
nitions are needed to promote consistency in the law. If subsurface storage
basins do not stop at state borders, the relevant property rights and legal
regulatory regime should not either.195
2. Potential Inapplicability of Available Examples
While this Note argues that the airspace example provided by
Causby is a more fitting analogy with regard to pore space ownership, sub-
surface property rights are vastly more encumbered than airspace rights,
and may present a different set of problems.196 They should therefore be
addressed to determine the extent that prior subsurface litigation may in-
form CCS. Significantly, the vast majority of subsurface property right liti-
gation involves resource extraction, waste injection, or natural gas storage,
implicating the removal or storage of a commodity rather than long term
sequestration of a substance for public benefit.197 Thus, not only are the
aforementioned holdings inconsistent with regard to their treatment of
the subsurface, but their instructive or predictive value in the context of
CCS may be limited. Disputes involving EOR, natural gas storage, or un-
derground waste storage often center upon interference with mineral rights
or reserves, and are not directly applicable to CCS.198 These claims largely
focus on forms of subsurface trespass that have “generally been accompa-
nied by removal of minerals, with the attendant damages consisting of the
193 See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W. 3d. 1, 11 (Tex. 2008);
Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D. La. 1988)
(“[T]raditional property concepts like trespass, must yield to the important interest of
conserving the natural resources of the state.”); Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 991 (following
Causby’s rationale).
194 Sprankling, supra note 115, at 1004 (2008) (“Broadly speaking, the deeper the dispute,
the less likely courts are to recognize the surface owner’s title.”).
195 See Decesar, supra note 7, at 266.
196 Klass & Wilson 2010, supra note 91, at 388–89.
197 Id. at 393.
198 See generally Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 124, at 256–81.
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value of the extracted minerals.”199 Conversely, CCS involves the infinite
sequestration, over potentially thousands of square miles, of vast amounts
of a substance that both science and society have deemed to be harmful to
humanity.200 Any actual damages incurred due to CCS (through surface
leakage, resource displacement, or blowout) could be legally remedied, but
absent actual economic or physical harm, there is no similar basis for sub-
surface damages related to CCS.201 CCS, as a noneconomic pursuit aimed
principally at climate mitigation, cannot be comfortably wedged into the
Procrustean bed of prior subsurface litigation.202 Because of this, Causby
and the airspace example, which created an upward property boundary
delineated by the limit of the owner’s full enjoyment and exploitation, may
be a more fitting analogy for purposes of CCS.203
CCS, as a transitional method of climate mitigation, should be con-
ceived as a public action taken in the interest of society, not as a funda-
mentally private economic endeavor, as profit incentives are lacking, or at
least of secondary importance.204 Thus, disputes involving EOR, mineral
extraction, or temporary natural gas storage focus on the extractive nature,
and inherent value, of the substance, and may not be adequate guides in
determining the proper ownership of the pore space.205 Indeed, if conflict
199 Nunez v. Wainoco & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 959 (La. 1986); see also Klass & Wilson
2010, supra note 91, at 392–93 (“[I]nstead of involving the use of space in the subsurface,
these cases involve the use of valuable resources to be taken from the subsurface for com-
mercial gain.”); Sprankling, supra note 115, at 1005 (“[D]ecisions concerning the right to use
and enjoy subsurface lands address only five main topics: (a) groundwater; (b) oil and gas;
(c) hard rock minerals; (d) objects embedded in the soil; and (e) waste disposal. In fact, these
are the only economically productive uses of the subsurface currently possible.”).
200 See supra Part I.C.
201 See Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 124, at 281 (“Although [CCS] can lead
to the physical migration of substances beneath neighboring property, [it] should not give
rise to actionable trespass without a showing of actual and substantial harm other than
drainage.”). This limitation of subsurface private property rights absent physical harm
or interference with the surface owner’s reasonable enjoyment is in some respects similar
to the dichotomy presented by the “property” and “liability” rules as explained by Calabresi
and Melamed. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). This
Note argues that the “property” rule surrounding subsurface storage spaces should be
abolished, making them publicly owned.
202 Klass & Wilson 2010, supra note 91, at 393 (“[T]he cases focusing on ownership of the
space for the resource, commodity, or development may be more helpful than cases focus-
ing on ownership of the resource, commodity, or development itself, although the latter
group of cases may still be instructive in some circumstances.”).
203 Id.
204 See Gresham, supra note 125, at iv.
205 Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass,” supra note 124, at 282.
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existed between CCS projects and subsurface uses, mineral extraction
rights could be legislatively prioritized, and any incidental oil and gas re-
moval that accompanied the use of old fields could be allocated to the owner
of the mineral estate.206 Ultimately, a review of subsurface litigation reveals
that it has limited instructive application to CCS, while adherence to the
cujus est solum doctrine can vary by jurisdiction. Potential CCS developers
would rightly view the current subsurface legal landscape as confused, and
would find few adequate guides or analogies in the case law. Uniform
statutory definitions of the pore space property interest, consistent across
jurisdictions, would rectify this “clarity” problem. Accordingly, Montana,
Wyoming, and North Dakota have statutorily granted the subsurface pore
space to the surface owner,207 providing clear definitions of subsurface
property in anticipation of future CCS development.
III. STATE PORE SPACE REGULATIONS
To address the uncertainty in the common law, Montana, Wyoming,
and North Dakota have enacted legislation regulating CCS and defining
pore space ownership.208 While these state CCS legal regimes are meant
to kick-start state-specific CCS investment,209 their inconsistent nature,
insufficient provisions, and finite jurisdiction may prove unsuited for a
national CCS program.210 Certainly, these states211 initially appear to be
206 See id. at 249 (“Such situations should be rare and may not arise at all if the subsurface
injection project is subject to a robust regulatory permitting system whose purpose, in part,
should be to prevent these situations from arising in the first place. In general, whether a
particular subsurface invasion should be prohibited or stopped should be left to envi-
ronmental regulatory agencies, not to courts.”).
207 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (detailing Wyoming, Montana, and North
Dakota laws, respectively, granting pore space ownership to the surface owner).
208 Klass & Wilson 2010, supra note 91, at 382. Several other states have passed CCS
regulations, but only the three covered here have defined pore space ownership rights. See
State CCS Policy—Sequestration, supra note 17. The IOGCC has developed model legislation
on CCS, which largely tracks what Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming have done. The
model statute “propose[s] the required acquisition” of pore space rights and “contemplate[s]
use of state natural gas eminent domain powers or oil and gas unitization processes” to
unify the storage area. IOGCC, supra note 24, at 27.
209 Wyoming Governor Dave Freudenthal declared that the law would put Wyoming in the
vanguard of clean energy production. State Rep. Tom Lubnau was even more optimistic,
declaring future generations will look back and say “that’s the day they did something.”
Bill McCarthy, House OKs Clean Coal Bills, WYOMING TRIB.-EAGLE, Feb. 14, 2008, at A8.
210 Klass & Wilson 2010, supra note 91, at 382.
211 Congress has seen legislation relating to CCS as well, but the bills largely continue to
languish in committee. The legislation uniformly seeks to enable CCS development, and
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on the right track, as general state regulation of CCS should be applauded.
However, these states have granted the pore space to private owners,212
gaining legal clarity while preventing pore space unity. Paradoxically, the
supposedly clarifying grant of private pore space has instead resulted in
an inconsistent patchwork of state regulation as states attempt to lessen
the burdens of private pore space ownership. Thus, state regulations con-
cerning field unitization,213 liability transfer,214 and pre-injection permit
requirements,215 ostensibly enacted to spur safe development, should rather
be seen as means of working around the burdens inherent to privatized
pore space. Therefore, while Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming have
set up superficially similar private pore space ownership regimes, ad hoc
state-level attempts to deal with private ownership have resulted in regula-
tory inconsistency.216 Thus, by committing the initial misstep of private
pore space ownership in the name of legal clarity, Montana, North Dakota,
and Wyoming have been forced to inconsistently tweak the bounds of pri-
vate ownership to actually enable CCS.217 Public pore space ownership
would remedy this.
Most unhelpfully, Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming have
granted pore space ownership to the surface estate,218 statutorily embracing
a sampling of proposed bills includes provisions to make the Secretary of Energy the “long-
term steward” of closed storage sites (transferring liability to the Federal government),
set up DOE CCS demonstration projects, and give CCS projects and retrofitting power plants
tax breaks and loan guarantees. See Coal Energy Bridge Act of 2010, S. 3714, 111th
Cong. § 1 (2010); Carbon Capture & Sequestration Deployment Revenue Act of 2010, S.
3590, 111th Cong. § 48E (2010); Dep’t of Energy Carbon Capture & Sequestration Program
Amendments Act of 2009, S. 1013, 111th Cong. § 963A (2009); Carbon Storage Stewardship
Trust Fund Act of 2009, S. 1502, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
212 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
213 See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
214 See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-123 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-22-08 (West 2009);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-313 (West 2010).
216 For example, Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming all allow for storage field unitization
within their CCS statutes, helpfully alleviating some of the problems created by private
ownership of the pore space. However, the states differ as to unitization procedures and
the percentages of owner approval required, even though the states all border each other
and will likely share some cross-border storage basins. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-204
(2009) (allowing unitization if sixty percent of owners approve, but not requiring as part of
site permit); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-22-08(5) (West 2009) (requiring the storage owner to
acquire the “consent of persons who own at least sixty percent of the storage reservoir’s
pore space” as a condition of site permitting); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-316(c) (West 2009)
(allowing unitization of the pore space if eighty percent of the pore space owners approve).
217 See infra notes 226–41 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
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the problems that private ownership of the pore space engenders.219
Sequestered gas is likely to spread,220 and it will be stored indefinitely in
pools that extend across state lines and below hundreds, if not thousands,
of surface land owners.221 State mandated private ownership of the pore
space directly conflicts with this physical reality. The legal challenges
raised in managing a national CCS system while contending with the
thousands of overlying private property owners that these laws create
would undoubtedly prove to be “daunting.”222 While certainly providing
clarity, private ownership of the pore space fails to solve the “unity”
problem, instead carving up potential CO2 storage basins into thousands
of pieces.223 Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming should be lauded for
taking the initial steps to legally prepare for CCS development, but em-
bracing private pore space ownership is misguided. These states have
perhaps realized the incongruity of private pore space ownership, and
have taken steps to mitigate the burdens.
Following this, the CCS laws in Montana, North Dakota,224 and
Wyoming have addressed the private ownership barrier to pore space
unitization, and each state provides for field unitization in some way.225
Thus, initial private ownership may be abrogated by collective field
unitization action, preventing individual pore space owners from exer-
cising the right to excludability.226 However, each state views unitization
differently, as Montana envisions it as a voluntary act, North Dakota
makes it a permit requirement, while Wyoming sees it as a means of gain-
ing efficiency while statutorily escaping charges of monopoly.227 Despite
these unitization allowances, default private pore space ownership still
remains an obstacle to widespread CCS development in the short term,
219 Problems would include difficulties with unitization of the pore space rights, potential
trespass liability due to subsurface migration, and a lack of private economic incentives
for development. See supra Part II.
220 See Moore, supra note 85, at 454.
221 Fish & Wood, supra note 63, at 3-6 to 3-7.
222 Gromatzky & Gregg, supra note 173, at 23.
223 Hayano, supra note 112, at 154 (“[The] legislation leaves unanswered how these rights
are to be amalgamated so that the storage space can be acquired on a scale sufficient to
allow GCS.”).
224 Uniquely, North Dakota does not allow for severance of the pore space from the surface
estate, raising concerns over the unitization of subsurface pore space. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-31-01 (West 2009).
225 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
226 FISH & MARTIN, supra note 18, at 3.
227 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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as the provisions would still require the cooperation of a significant major-
ity of pore space owners.228 As storage fields would likely cover large ex-
panses and hundreds of owners, unitization may become necessary, as
no one storage operator would own the entire field.229 Thus, these unit-
ization provisions may become de facto requirements if operators are to
gain access to large storage fields, as effective CCS would require.230 Field
unitization provisions essentially admit that private ownership may in-
hibit CCS development, but do not fully correct the problem. Allowing field
unitization after a supermajority of the pore space owners consent may
therefore lessen the burdens inherent to amalgamating hundreds of po-
tential pore space interests,231 but significant barriers remain due to the
sheer scale of CCS development required.
Additionally, Montana and North Dakota lessen private CCS de-
velopment costs by rightly providing for a conditional transfer of future
storage site liability and ownership to the state.232 This is likely due to
a recognition of the infinite timescale of CCS and the greater ability of
states to shoulder such a burden.233 Montana and North Dakota would
allow transfer of the site to the state after a set period of years if the
operator demonstrates the integrity of the storage site and meets statu-
tory requirements, and the state assumes ownership and liability with-
out compensating the operator.234 This allowance concedes a central
limitation to private pore space ownership and CCS development: as CO2
sequestration must be infinite, monitoring and liability responsibilities
228 Sixty percent in Montana and North Dakota, and eighty percent in Wyoming. Id.
These requirements could raise the prospect of holdouts.
229 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 91, at 365 (noting that future CCS operators would
need access to millions of acres of storage space to be truly effective).
230 Id.
231 See Fish & Wood, supra note 63.
232 MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-183(1) (2009) (allowing transfer of title and liability to the
state after fifteen years if certain conditions are met); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-22-17(1)
(West 2009) (allowing transfer of title and liability to the state ten years after injection
ceases if certain conditions are met).
233 SONJA NOWAKOWSKI, MONT. LEGIS. ENERGY & TELECOMM. INTERIM COMM., CARBON
SEQUESTRATION STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF GEOLOGICAL & TERRESTRIAL CARBON
SEQUESTRATION REGULATORY & POLICY: A REPORT TO 61ST LEGISLATURE 32 (Legis.
Servs. Div. 2008), available at http://leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/committees/interim
/2007_2008/2008carbonsequestration.pdf (noting that uncertainty surrounding carbon
sequestration and length of liability may deter private development).
234 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Conversely, and regrettably, Wyoming does
not allow private CCS operators to transfer liability to the state after site closure, and the
state merely takes on prospective monitoring responsibilities while expressly denying future
state liability for sequestration. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104(d)(vii) (West 2011).
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post-closure may prove overwhelming for private actors,235 perhaps dis-
suading private parties from initiating development. Transfer to the state
would certainly alleviate this concern, but it raises questions as to why
the state does not own the pore space, and control the project, at the outset.
Where transfer of liability is not allowed by states that envision private
development and ownership, such as in Wyoming,236 CCS development
faces a significant hurdle.237
If states regulate the beginning of CCS projects through permitting
requirements,238 allow field unitization to overcome private ownership,239
and permit transfer of liability and ownership post-closure,240 the public
will be intimately involved in CCS development. The commingling of pri-
vate and public functions may unnecessarily complicate CCS development,
and may be a recognition of the challenges of private pore space ownership.
Indeed, current CCS legal regimes are overly complex insofar as they cling
to private pore space ownership at the outset while tempering (or removing)
the impact throughout the development process. This discordant system,
sandwiching private ownership and injection between public permitting
and eventual public ownership, would be simplified through outright public
ownership of the pore space. Under current guidelines, the relevance of pri-
vate pore space ownership is largely confined to the initial development
and injection process, with the public regulating permitting, allowing uni-
fication to override minority owner rights, and ultimately becoming the
storage site owner. Where private development and injection may not be
economically viable absent subsidy, even this private function is eroded.241
Indeed, it is likely that private development would be infeasible without
these “workarounds,” revealing the shortcomings of private pore space
ownership. The state, and public, are thus inexorably involved in CCS
development. Insofar as the private ownership system is only enabled by
235 ELIZABETH ALDRICH, ENERGY POL’Y INST., ANALYSIS OF EXISTING AND POSSIBLE REGIMES
FOR CARBON AND SEQUESTRATION: A REVIEW FOR POLICYMAKERS 12–17 (2011), available
at http://epi.boisestate.edu/media/6079/epi ccs pore space regimes.pdf.
236 Id.
237 See Karl Puckett, Bill Would Give Board Carbon Storage Control, GREAT FALLS TRIB.,
Mar. 6, 2009, at M3. At hearing on the Montana legislation, a representative for PPL
Montana, which owns several coal plants in the state, stated that “without that [state
assumption of] liability, we don’t believe sequestration will occur.” Id.
238 MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-111(5)(a) (2009), amended by Mont. Laws ch. 19, S.B. 31
(2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-22-04 (West 2009).
239 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
241 Gresham, supra note 125, at iv.
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these sorts of public ownership-esque allowances, clarity, unity, and sim-
plicity should be achieved through a universally public system.
Lastly, state-based pore space property regimes, and the related
reliance upon private property ownership of the pore space, threaten just
the sort of Balkanization of regulations that Judge Wilkinson warned of
in North Carolina v. TVA.242 In TVA, the Fourth Circuit rejected the use of
public nuisance standards to bypass the Clean Air Act, fearing that such a
situation would create “a confused patchwork of standards, to the detriment
of industry and the environment alike.”243 Montana, North Dakota, and
Wyoming are rightly attempting to address the inconsistent treatment244
of the pore space at common law. However, such an important national,
public program as large-scale as CCS should not be hindered by the con-
straints of fifty separate state property regimes and the subsequent nego-
tiations with thousands of prospective owners.245 Pore spaces and storage
fields do not stop at state borders,246 and regulations should be crafted con-
sistently across jurisdictions to provide a clear legal foundation for CCS to
begin mitigating climate change in the near future.247
CONCLUSION
Climate change is a growing concern248 that will not wait for new,
or as yet undeveloped alternative technologies to reduce anthropogenic CO2
emissions. CCS represents perhaps the best available “bridge” technology
that can effectively mitigate CO2 emissions until non-carbon dependant
energy generation is developed on a sufficiently broad scale.249 To enable
the sorts of widespread CCS that would actually effect CO2 emissions, CCS
developers will need access to “millions” of acres of underground storage
fields.250 Private ownership of this storage space—the pore spaces—will
242 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
243 Id. at 296.
244 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
245 See generally Fish & Wood, supra note 63, at 3-15.
246 Decesar, supra note 7, at 266.
247 Importantly, the EPA has begun to address CCS, and recently finalized rules protecting
drinking water near CCS sites and setting GHG reporting requirements for facilities that
engage in CCS. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geological Sequestration (GS) Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230
(Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124, 144–47); Mandatory Reporting of
Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg.
75,060 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 72, 78, 98).
248 IPCC, supra note 1, at 36.
249 See Attanasio, supra note 38, at 10,380; WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 5.
250 Klass & Wilson 2010, supra note 91, at 365.
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fundamentally frustrate this endeavor. If CCS is going to be effective as
a tool to combat climate change, a clear, uniform delegation of the pore
space to the public may be necessary.251 States may ably do so following
the Supreme Court’s rationale in Causby,252 as the pore spaces lay below
the limits of private property or private enjoyment.253 Public ownership
will reduce regulatory variation across jurisdictions, create storage field
unitization, and allow for the public development of a project that is
potentially lacking traditional private economic incentives.254 Dividing the
pore spaces into millions of narrow tubes of private ownership will greatly
inhibit CCS development and fundamentally misunderstands subsurface
geology and private utility.255
States should uniformly grant the subsurface pore space to the
public. This would allow the state permitting agency to be a “one-stop
shop[]” for CCS development, removing the need for statutory concessions
such as unitization requirements or liability transfers.256 Just as the state
is the only entity capable of managing the infinite post-closure monitoring
and liability burdens inherent to CCS, the state, and therefore the public,
should be recognized as the legitimate owner and manager of this valuable
resource.257 The public trust doctrine has been previously expanded to en-
compass important public resources,258 and insofar as CCS is envisioned
as a valuable climate change mitigation strategy, the pore spaces must be
publicly owned to prevent a “tragedy of the commons.”259
251 See Puckett, supra note 237. The State of Montana originally supported state ownership
of the pore space, believing that it would simplify the process. Id. Mike Volesky, a repre-
sentative of the governor’s office, questioned the propriety of private ownership, asking
industry, “would you . . . like to deal with a majority of those landowners? . . . Or would you
rather simply go to the state and get your permit[?]” Id. Granting ownership of the pore
space to the surface owner was seen as the second-best option, but ultimately won out due
to resistance from interest groups. Email from Mike Volesky, Governor’s Pol’y Advisor for
Natural Res., to James Zadick (Sept. 23, 2010) (on file with author).
252 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Legislation to grant the pore space to the
State under the public trust doctrine was proposed in Montana, but was tabled in committee.
H.B. 502, 61st Leg. (Mont. 2009) (“Under the public trust doctrine, the state of Montana
owns the exclusive right to use all pore space in all strata below the surface of this state, with
the exception of lands owned by or under the jurisdiction of the United States . . . .”).
253 See supra discussion, Part II. The pore spaces are not a protectable private property
interest, just as the navigable airspace is not. Further, takings claims would likely be
avoided. Id.
254 See Gresham, supra note 125, at iv.
255 See Sprankling, supra note 115, at 1029.
256 Puckett, supra note 237.
257 Reisinger et al., supra note 8, at 25.
258 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
259 Heller, supra note 131, at 1166.
